The Medicaid poverty expansions were among the major health policy initiatives of the late 1980s. This paper examines changes over a nine-year period in access, burdens, and coverage among children eligible for Medicaid through the expansions. Among eligible children, the Medicaid expansions reduced rates of uninsurance, increased access to physicians, and reduced families' risk of bearing a heavy financial burden. Gaps remain, however, and expansion-eligible children are more likely than never-eligible children to have been uninsured, to have gone without a physician office visit, and to have lived in a family that spent at least 20% of family income on medical care.
During the mid-1980s, an increase in the proportion of poor and low-income children who were uninsured spurred Congress to expand Medicaid eligibility rules for children. In 1977, about 21% of children living in families with incomes below 200% of poverty were uninsured; by 1987, this figure had climbed to nearly 31% (Weinick and Monheit 1999) . Concerned with rates of uninsurance as well as increases in low-weight births and neonatal mortality rates, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility to poor and low-income children (and pregnant women) in a series of legislative acts between 1984 and 1990 . Under these so-called poverty-related expansions, Medicaid coverage became available to more children beyond those in the traditional welfare assistance population. By expanding public insurance coverage, Congress intended to improve access to care and health status for targeted poor and low-income children.
The Medicaid poverty expansions were among the major health policy initiatives of the late 1980s. Although not all eligible children became enrolled, the number eligible for Medicaid coverage doubled as a result of the legislative changes (Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1998) . A growing literature has evaluated the impacts of the changes in eligibility, with most of this literature measuring the expansions' effect on Medicaid enrollment and reductions in private coverage. As Congress further expanded public programs for children with the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997, debate has continued to focus on the potential effect of expansions in public coverage crowding out private insurance coverage. Numerous studies of the extent of crowdout have been published and estimates range from 11% to 40%, varying by data source, methodology, and definition of control group (see for example, Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenney 1996; Yazici and Kaestner 2000; Shore-Sheppard 1997; Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 1999) .
In this paper, we move beyond the previous studies of crowd-out and focus on the ''ABCs'' of children's health: a broader set of impact measures including access to care and utilization, the financial burden of purchasing insurance and obtaining care, and the prevalence of public and private insurance coverage. We begin by tracking changes in insurance coverage between 1987 and 1996 among children who were targeted by the Medicaid expansions, comparing their experience to that of other children. Next, we examine access, since much of the existing literature evaluating the impact of the Medicaid expansions tends to overlook changes in access to care and use of services that were a goal of the legislation. Increases in coverage were expected to lead to increases in preventive care and other appropriate use of health care services, resulting in improvements in health status. Currie and Gruber (1996) published one of the few papers that directly measures the impact of the expansions on utilization as well as on children's health status. They found that making a child eligible for Medicaid reduced by nearly half the probability that the child would go without any physician office visits over the course of a year. Furthermore, increases in Medicaid eligibility had significant effects on child mortality rates, reducing mortality from all internal causes (such as disease) by 8%. Racine et al. (2001) found small increases in the probability of visiting a physician among poor minority children but no impacts on health status as a result of the Medicaid expansions. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to measure changes in health status over time, we are able to compare changes in medical care utilization and access to care.
Finally, we fill another important gap in the existing literature evaluating the impact of the Medicaid expansions by examining changes in financial burdens for medical care. The option of private employer-sponsored coverage may have been available for some families with children on Medicaid. Such coverage also may have imposed heavy financial burdens because of outof-pocket premiums. Moreover, private insurance available to low-income families may provide inferior protection against the high costs of health care because of cost-sharing requirements. About 44% of poor and low-income individuals with private insurance were underinsured in 1994 compared to 18% of middle-income and 8% of upper-income families (Short and Banthin 1995) . As the importance of preventive care, especially for children, became more widely acknowledged, private insurance policies were slow to cover such benefits. For example, in 1987 only 13% of privately insured people had policies providing for complete coverage of well-child care visits (Short and Banthin 1995) . Medicaid, on the other hand, provides complete coverage for well-child care.
In this paper, we assess the impact of the Medicaid expansions by defining a policy-relevant control group that has not been used in any other papers in this literature. Our detailed eligibility simulation allows us to define children eligible for Medicaid as well as those eligible for the State Children's Health Insurance Program. Of course, SCHIP was not enacted until 1997, and full implementation required a number of years. Nonetheless, the children defined as eligible for SCHIP form a highly relevant comparison group for the Medicaid-eligible children. Moreover, they represent an interesting focus of public policy in their own right. Ineligible for public insurance throughout the period of the Medicaid expansions, SCHIP-eligible children experienced trends in the private insurance market that likely would have been seen among Medicaid expansion-eligible children had the expansions not occurred.
Analytic Approach
In this paper, we examine the changes in children's access to care, financial burdens, and health insurance coverage between two points in time: 1987 and 1996. The first year largely predates the Medicaid poverty-related expansions in coverage, while the second point in time falls well after the states had implemented most of the changes in eligibility. By carefully simulating eligibility for public programs, we can examine the changes among children over the nine-year period, differentiating by eligibility status. To measure the impact of the Medicaid expansions, we applied a difference-in-differences (D-in-D) strategy by defining treatment and control groups and comparing changes over time.
For both years, we defined four groups of children based on eligibility for public insurance coverage. The first group is composed primarily of children who were automatically eligible for Medicaid because they also were eligible for cash assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. We used state-specific eligibility rules that were in effect in 1987 to define this group in both years, keeping the rules constant over time. The second group of children were eligible for Medicaid under the poverty-related and other expansions. Again, we applied state-specific eligibility rules that were in effect in 1996 for both years of our data. Although the Medicaid expansions had not been implemented in 1987, we used the 1996 rules to identify the children who would have been eligible for the expansions had they been enacted earlier. This second group of children is the treatment group. The third group we identified were children who would have been eligible for coverage through SCHIP, which was enacted in 1997 and implemented over several years. We used state-specific eligibility rules in effect in the year 2000. We also included in this group a small number of children who were made eligible for Medicaid coverage by eligibility expansions implemented between 1997 and 2000. This third group of children forms our comparison group. The fourth and final group of children are those who were never eligible for public coverage. These consist mainly of middle-and highincome children.
Critical to assessing any program such as the Medicaid expansions is gauging what would have happened in the absence of the policy changes. One way to do this is to define a comparison group that is similar in some respects to the treatment group, but which would not be not eligible for the intervention (in this case Medicaid eligibility). As mentioned earlier, children eligible for SCHIP are similar to children eligible for Medicaid under the poverty expansions. Although mean income for SCHIP-eligible children is higher than the mean income for Medicaid expansion-eligible children, the range of incomes included in both groups is similar. The two groups are above the line that would qualify them for both cash assistance and Medicaid coverage. All of the expansion-eligible and most of the SCHIP-eligible children lived in families with incomes below 200% of poverty. SCHIP-eligible children lived in families with an average, aftertax 1996 income of $27,750, compared to an average after-tax income of $17,506 for Medicaid expansion-eligible children (shown in Table 1 ). However, the populations overlap to a considerable degree, because the Medicaid poverty expansions were implemented unevenly across states. 1 In fact, about 90% of children eligible for SCHIP under state-specific rules in effect in 1999 would have been eligible for Medicaid had they lived in states that had expanded Medicaid to the fullest extent possible under federal laws (Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1999) .
Defining a comparison group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group helps us avoid pitfalls that might arise in comparisons between expansion-eligible children and all ineligible children. We know, for example, that trends in insurance coverage were different for low-income families than for middle-and high-income families (Weinick and Monheit 1999) . There was much less deterioration of coverage among higher-income children. It is inappropriate to compare Medicaid expansion-eligible children to all ineligible children since this would have put low-, middle-, and high-income children into one control group and diluted the comparisons we make in the analysis. Of course, even when we narrow our comparison group to include only the children who were later targeted by SCHIP, there is no guarantee that in the absence of the Medicaid expansions the treatment group's experience would have mirrored exactly that of the comparison group. Indeed, insofar as our comparison group had higher disposable family income than our treatment group, the comparison group may well have experienced less deterioration in their ''ABCs'' of health care than the treatment group would have, absent expanded eligibility. If so, our D-in-D estimates may tend to understate the effects of the Medicaid expansions.
At its most simple, the difference-in-differences estimator is the difference between the changes in the two groups' means. If the mean value M of some outcome measure for Medicaid expansion-eligible children is indicated by subscript i, and the value for children eligible for the State Children's Health Insurance Program is indicated by subscript j, then we have
where t and t ÿ 1 indicate the time period. 2 In addition to the plain D-in-D estimates, we also report multivariate D-in-Ds, whereby we replace the simple means in equation 1 with conditional expectations having controlled for a range of sociodemographic characteristics in the regressions. These characteristics include sex, age group, race-ethnicity, health status, region, urban or rural location, education level of parent, family income, and family structure. 3 The multivariate D-in-D estimates control for some of the remaining differences between the treatment and comparison groups. For example, SCHIP-eligible children are older on average than Medicaid expansion-eligible children and less likely to be minority (Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1999) .
As previously mentioned, our analytic approach examines all children who were eligible for the Medicaid expansions whether or not they were covered by Medicaid, covered by private insurance, or remained uninsured. The analysis is not limited to enrolled children, because eligibility rather than coverage is the margin at which legislative policy operates. Furthermore, by focusing on eligibility we avoid the potential endogeneity that would arise from classifying children by enrollment status. The data we use to compute eligibility status are explained in more detail in the next section.
Data and Simulation of Program Eligibility
The data for our analysis come from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), two cross-sectional surveys that neatly bracket the pre-and post-periods of the major federally legislated expansions in Medicaid eligi-bility. The 1987 NMES preceded implementation of the Medicaid expansions, while the 1996 MEPS came after states had implemented the major parts of their Medicaid expansions. 4 Both samples are stratified and clustered random samples of households, which, when combined with sample weights, are designed to yield nationally representative estimates of insurance coverage, medical expenditures and utilization of services, insurance premiums, and a wide range of other health-related and socioeconomic characteristics. We included observations for every positively weighted child younger than 19 years old. This resulted in 10,030 observations representing 67.6 million children for 1987, and 6,595 observations representing 75.4 million children for 1996. For more on the NMES and MEPS, see Edwards and Berlin (1989) , Emmons and Hill (1994) , Cohen et al. (1996) , and Cohen (1997) .
Unlike Medicaid enrollment, Medicaid eligibility cannot be observed directly in our data, and therefore must be simulated. To simulate eligibility, we used the family relationship information that was collected in the NMES and MEPS to construct ''Medicaid health insurance eligibility units,'' the subset of family members whose income would be counted for purposes of computing Medicaid eligibility and coverage. We converted earned income into net income by subtracting state-specific income disregards for work-related expenses and other things (Ku, Ullman, and Almeida 1999) . In the context of these units, we employed data regarding age of child, family income, marital status, employment status, and family structure. We then applied state-specific rules for determining Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility. The basic eligibility simulation model has been described in detail elsewhere (see Selden, Banthin, Cohen 1998) . In this paper, we improved upon earlier efforts by taking more precise account of family composition, unearned income, and income deeming according to state-specific rules. 5 Each child in the 1987 and 1996 samples was assigned to one of four mutually exclusive eligibility groups: Traditionally, Medicaid was available to children who were eligible to receive cash assistance through AFDC. In our analysis, this group of children constitutes the first and poorest group of Medicaid-eligible children, whose eligibility was not affected by the passage of laws expanding eligibility. We refer to this group as the AFDC-eligible group, but we also included those children eligible for Medicaid as of 1987 through other programs such as state-specific AFDCunemployed parents, Ribicoff children, medically needy, and pregnant women and infants. However, we did not simulate Medicaid eligibility based on disability status or spend-down, nor did we include eligibility through statefunded programs that offered limited or temporary medical assistance.
The second group of eligible children are those who were made eligible for Medicaid coverage during the legislative expansions of eligibility between 1984 and 1990. We simulated Medicaid eligibility by applying rules that were in effect as of 1996, and thus defined the treatment group for this analysis. In addition to children who became eligible through the federal expansions, we also included in this group children who were made eligible through other programs between 1987 and 1996. This included expansions of the medically needy program and 1115 Waiver programs. In states where reforms have required families to pay means-tested premiums at higher income levels, we deemed eligible only those children who were in families with incomes qualifying for free coverage.
The third group of eligible children serves as the comparison group. These are children who would have been eligible for SCHIP under eligibility rules in effect in year 2000. In this third group, we also included a small number of children who would have become eligible for Medicaid because of eligibility expansions between 1997 and 2000. This included the federally mandated phased-in Medicaid expansion of all children born after September 30, 1983, and living below poverty. In this third group, we also included a few children with incomes above 200% of poverty who lived in states where SCHIP eligibility thresholds extended to 250% and 300% of poverty. In some cases, these families would have been required to pay means-tested premiums for the SCHIP coverage. All children in the second group and most children in the third group lived in low-income families. The fourth and final group includes children living in middle-and high-income families who did not qualify for Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility at any time.
Outcome Measures: Access, Burden, and Coverage
We examined three groups of outcome measures in comparing how children fared over time between 1987 and 1996: access, burden, and coverage. We examined access to care by four different variables: a) reporting a usual source of care, and b) having at least one visit to a doctor's office, c) having at least one visit to a dentist's office, and d) having at least one visit to an emergency room. Children have better access to care when they can identify a usual source of medical care and when they have had at least one visit during the year to a physician and to a dentist. A visit to the emergency room, on the other hand, often is associated with poor access to care.
Unlike other health surveys, the NMES and MEPS also permitted us to compute the financial burdens for medical care, our second outcome measure. We computed out-of-pocket expenditures and disposable income net of taxes at the level of the Medicaid eligibility unit and used them to compute burdens as a function of disposable income available to the unit (or family). We made our calculations at the family level because our assumption is that family income was available to pay for the health expenditures of each individual in the family. In addition, some health expenditures such as health insurance premiums were defined at the family level. We brought these family-level measures down to the person level in order to calculate population frequencies for the children in our sample. For each of the four eligibility groups, we compared changes over time in disposable family incomes, family outof-pocket expenditures for medical care goods and services, family out-of-pocket expenditures on premiums, and total out-of-pocket expenditures. We then computed the percentages of children living in families with financial burdens of 10% or more and 20% or more of disposable family income, showing how these percentages vary over time and eligibility group.
Our final set of outcome measures is coverage. To measure the lack of insurance coverage, we compared three different measures of being uninsured: uninsured all year, uninsured for at least four months, and uninsured at any point during the year. Being uninsured for a full year affects the fewest number of children, while lacking insurance at any point during the year affects the most.
Data Editing
Both data sets were substantially re-edited for this paper in order to enhance their quality and their consistency across time. Starting with the 1987 public use data, the most substantial revisions were to out-of-pocket expenditures on medical care. NMES public use files provide data on charges; our focus in this paper is on actual payments (as measured by MEPS). For this analysis, we relied on the payment variables in the revised NMES expenditure files produced by Zuvekas and Cohen (2002) .
In addition to editing expenditures, we made minor modifications to NMES private premiums, imputing amounts for a small number of policyholders who were missing premium data. 6 Finally, we re-edited the 1987 income data, replacing earnings imputations (as reported in the NMES public use data) whenever possible with earnings estimates that we constructed using employment data on wages and hours worked collected during each round of the survey (following the methodology now used in MEPS). We then edited imputed unearned income amounts to reflect more closely the distribution of unearned income sources conditional on earnings (again bringing the NMES data into closer alignment with MEPS editing methods). We inflated all 1987 dollars to 1996 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all goods and services.
Turning to the 1996 MEPS public use data, we edited MEPS income using data from the linked 1995 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), replacing missing MEPS income amounts with inflation-adjusted NHIS income data for the same household from the previous year. 7 In addition, a main concern with the 1996 MEPS involved low response rates on outof-pocket premium data. MEPS obtained outof-pocket premium data from two sources. For non-employment-related coverage, premiums were obtained directly from household respondents. We edited these public use data, imputing for missing values using a hotdeck method that replaced missing values with reported values from similar people. For employment-related coverage, MEPS obtained premium data through an employer follow-back survey. The conditional response rate for premium information for policyholders who accepted offers of employment-related health insurance was only 30%. We filled in missing values using a method that combined hotdeck imputations from valid responses with regression-based benchmarks from the nationally representative list sample of employers provided by the 1996 MEPS Insurance Component survey (MEPS-IC). Although the original reported employment-related premium data are not by themselves nationally representative, the imputed premiums compare closely to nationally representative benchmarks from the MEPS-IC. All premium amounts (in both 1987 and 1996) were adjusted to reflect the portion of the year during which coverage actually was held.
For both years, we computed disposable income by subtracting tax payments from gross family income. We simulated FICA and Medicare taxes on earnings using MEDTAX (Moeller 1994) , and federal and state income taxes using the Internet version of TAXSIM 4.0 (Feenberg and Coutts 1993) .
Results
Our paper focuses on the ABCs of children's health care: access, burden, and coverage. In presenting the results of our analysis of how these three sets of outcomes measures have changed over time, it makes sense for us to switch the order. We begin with coverage and conclude with burden since coverage affects access to care which, in turn, affects burden.
Insurance Coverage
The most significant impact of the Medicaid expansions in eligibility for children was changes in rates of uninsurance among children eligible for the program (see Table 1 ). Among Medicaid expansion-eligible children, represented in the third row of estimates in Table 1 , the percentage who were uninsured the full year fell from 26% in 1987 to 16.1% in 1996, a drop of 9.9 percentage points. The percentage who were uninsured for four months or more during the year decreased from 42.7% to 29.6%, while the percentage who were uninsured at any point during the year fell from 51.4% to 41.1% from 1987 to 1996. This downward movement contrasts with the changes among children who would have been eligible for SCHIP if it had been implemented by 1987 and 1996. For these children, all three measures of uninsured status showed increases between 1987 and 1996. In particular, the percentage of SCHIP-eligible children uninsured the full year grew from 14.1% in 1987 to 18.9% in 1996, an increase of 4.8 percentage points.
Comparing the changes over time in insurance coverage between the Medicaid expansion-eligible children and the SCHIP-eligible children, the simple D-in-D estimator is ÿ14.7 percentage points, while the multivariate D-in-D estimator, controlling for sociodemographic factors, is ÿ15.7 percentage points. In other words, these results suggest that in the absence of the Medicaid expansions, the percentage of children uninsured for the full year in the group of expansion eligibles would have grown from 26% in 1987 to 31.8% in 1996 (adding the multivariate D-in-D estimator of 15.7 points to the 1996 uninsured rate of 16.1 points). This interpretation of the results makes explicit the assumptions involved in our choice of comparison group. Using the SCHIP eligibles as a comparison group suggests that the impact of the Medicaid expansions on coverage rates was quite large. It is also possible that these results may be understated because we might have expected the Medicaid expansioneligible children to have fared even worse over time than the somewhat higher income group of SCHIP-eligible children.
When the expansion-eligible children are compared to all other children rather than just SCHIPeligible children, the impact of the Medicaid expansions on reducing the percentage uninsured still holds but is smaller. In 1987, 10.7% of all children were uninsured for the full year compared with 11.1% in 1996 (this difference is not statistically significant). Comparing this to the change among Medicaid expansion-eligible children, the D-in-D estimator with sociodemographic controls is significant at ÿ12.2 percentage points.
The impact of the Medicaid expansions on changes in rates of insurance coverage also holds no matter what measure of insurance is used as an outcome variable. For example, among Medicaid expansion-eligible children, there is a 13.1 percentage point drop in the percentage who were uninsured at least four months or more during the year, from 42.7% in 1987 to 29.6% in 1996. At the same time, there is an increase in the percentage of SCHIP-eligible children who were uninsured at least four months during the year, from 22.3% in 1987 to 28.1% in 1996. The D-in-D estimator was ÿ20.2 percentage points when controlling for other factors. Table 2 reports changes over time in four measures of access to care and use of medical services that are comparable in the NMES and MEPS data. Our data reveal that the Medicaid expansions had a significant impact on one measure, with smaller but statistically insignificant changes in a second measure. The percentage of children having at least one visit to a doctor's office increased among expansion-eligible children, from 56.8% in 1987 to 64.4% in 1996. This increase in utilization is quite different from the lack of change among SCHIP-eligible children, where 62.7% had at least one visit in 1987 compared to 61.8% in 1996. The D-in-D estimator comparing the two groups is 9.3 percentage points with controls. The change among expansion-eligible children also is significantly different from the change among all other children (D-in-D estimate of 7.7 percentage points with controls).
Access and Use
The percentage of Medicaid expansion-eligible children having at least one dental visit during the year did not change significantly (20.4% in 1987 compared with 24.6% in 1996) . Among SCHIP-eligible children having at least one dental visit, there was an insignificant decrease from 37.6% to 35.5%. The D-in-D estimate of 6.3 percentage points is significant only at the 10% level.
The data reveal a secular trend in the percentage of children reporting a usual source of care. Between 1987 and 1996, this percentage increased by three to five points among three out of four groups of children; the slight decrease in AFDCeligible children reporting a usual source of care is statistically insignificant. There was also a trend away from using the emergency room among all groups of children and no significant differences in the Medicaid expansion-eligible group.
Financial Burdens
Both of the previous outcomes measures, insurance coverage and access to care, can measurably affect financial burdens for health care. Table 3 displays the component parts of our burden calculations, while Table 4 shows different measures of out-of-pocket burdens expressed in constant 1996 dollars. All of the expenditure and burden measures presented in these two tables were computed at the family level and then brought down to the individual child level and averaged within eligibility category. Children with zero expenditures on health care services and/or premiums were included in the relevant cell averages.
In the first two columns of figures of Table 3 , average disposable family income levels vary by eligibility group. Children eligible for Medicaid through AFDC rules lived in the poorest families, with average annual family incomes of $10,311 in 1996. In the same year, Medicaid expansioneligible children had average annual family incomes of $17,506, while SCHIP-eligible children had average annual family incomes of $27,750. Children who were not eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP lived in families with average annual incomes of $53,629 in 1996. Table 3 separates total out-of-pocket spending into two component parts: spending on medical care and spending on premiums. Across all children, there is a drop in family out-of-pocket spending on health care services from 1987 to 1996, measured in real dollars. The decrease in family out-of-pocket spending on health care services among Medicaid expansion-eligible children is quite large, falling from $1,223 in 1987 to $644 in 1996. Although the decrease of 47% in family out-of-pocket spending among expansion-eligible children is greater than the 20% decrease among SCHIP-eligible children, the Din-D estimate is not statistically significant. The story is very different with respect to the trend in out-of-pocket spending on premiums. Among all children, family out-of-pocket spending on premiums increased from $578 in 1987 to $910 in 1996, annually. Among SCHIP-eligible children, whose families would be more likely to purchase private coverage or go uninsured, average out-of-pocket premium payments increased from $684 in 1987 to $939 in 1996. Notwithstanding these trends, average out-of-pocket premium payments paid by families with children eligible for the Medicaid expansions did not increase significantly between the two years. This is because the prevalence of private insurance within the Medicaid expansion-eligible group declined as more children enrolled in Medicaid (data not shown). Although premium payments increased among those expansion-eligible children who were enrolled in private plans, the combination of these two trends left average premium payments across the entire eligibility group essentially flat. The D-in-D estimator measuring changes in average out-of-pocket premiums between expansion-eligible children and SCHIP-eligible children was $212 (statistically significant at the 10% level). Total family out-of-pocket spending on both medical care and premiums is presented in the last two columns of Table 3 .
To compute the final burden measures presented in Table 4 , total out-of-pocket spending on medical care summed over all family members is divided by total disposable family income (gross income less taxes). In 1987, 30.1% of children eligible for the Medicaid expansions lived in families spending 10% or more of disposable family income on medical care. This dropped to 23.9% in 1996. There was no significant change among SCHIP-eligible children, of whom approximately 20.9% were living in families spending 10% or more of family income in 1996. The D-in-D estimator of ÿ7.4 percentage points is significant at the 5% level when sociodemographic factors are factored in. Likewise, comparing the change among expansion-eligible children to the change in all other children, the D-in-D result is significant at ÿ8.7 percentage points with controls. There are no significant changes over time in the percentage of children who lived in families spending 20% or more of family disposable income on medical care and premiums.
In the third measure of financial burden, we incorporated the full cost of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums. The full premium, including both the employee's share and the taxadjusted employer's share, was added to the numerator of our burden measure. At the same time, the full premium was added to the denominator to represent wages that would have been earned in the absence of employer contributions to total health premiums. This reflects economic theory that workers bear the full cost of fringe benefits in the form of reduced wages. By this measure, about 18.9% of Medicaid expansioneligible children lived in families spending 20% or more of adjusted disposable family income on medical care in 1996. This is significantly higher than the percentage of SCHIP-eligible (12.6%) and never-eligible children (4.4%) who lived in families with severe financial burdens for medical care in 1996. According to this mea-sure, there was a slight decrease in burden among the Medicaid expansion-eligible children compared to an increase among the SCHIP-eligible children. The D-in-D estimator of ÿ5.6 percentage points is significant only at the 10% level.
Remaining Gaps
Many gaps in access, burdens, and coverage remained in 1996 between Medicaid expansioneligible and never-eligible children. One can reexamine Tables 1 through 4 again from this perspective. To the extent that levels of access, burden, and coverage among never-eligible children can be considered social norms, the Medicaid expansions had not been fully successful as of 1996 in achieving comparable outcomes in the target population. For example, although the expansions were important in reducing levels of uninsurance among the Medicaid-eligible children compared to the past, these children were still three times more likely to be uninsured for four months or longer in 1996 when compared to never-eligible children (29.6% vs. 9.7%).
There are similar gaps in access and burdens. Despite eligibility for public insurance coverage, Medicaid expansion-eligible children in 1996 were significantly less likely to report having a usual source of care (87.6% vs. 94.2%), less likely to have had at least one visit to a doctor's office (64.4% vs. 73%), and less likely to have had at least one visit to a dentist's office (24.6% vs. 52.2%) compared to never-eligible children. Furthermore, Medicaid expansion-eligible children in 1996 were more than six times as likely to live in a family that spent 20% or more of family income on medical care compared to never-eligible children (11.3% vs 1.7%). Despite the protections of Medicaid coverage, many Medicaid expansion-eligible children lived in families vulnerable to severe financial burdens from health care expenditures. The impact of financial strain can have direct consequences in terms of foregoing needed care. In a measure of barriers to care available at the family level in the 1996 MEPS, we found large differences between expansion-eligible children and nevereligible children. About 20.1% of Medicaid expansion-eligible children lived in families where at least one member had reported delaying or doing without needed care for financial reasons compared to 6.9% of never-eligible children (data not shown).
Conclusion
The results presented here provide evidence that the Medicaid expansions had a significant impact on the ABCs of children's health care: access to care, financial burdens, and rates of coverage among eligible children. Compared to similar children who would have been eligible for SCHIP had it been implemented in 1987 and 1996, the Medicaid expansion-eligible children fared better over the nine-year period in all three dimensions of health care. First, expansion-eligible children experienced reductions in the rates of uninsurance between 1987 and 1996 rather than the increases that likely would have occurred in the absence of the legislative changes. Second, our analysis found that the Medicaid expansions increased the likelihood that eligible children would have at least one visit to a doctor's office. Finally, we found that Medicaid expansion-eligible children and their families were less likely to experience severe financial burdens for medical care as a result of the increased eligibility for Medicaid coverage. Defining a comparison group as similar as possible to the treatment group helped avoid the pit-falls that might arise in comparisons between expansion-eligible children and all ineligible children. Using the SCHIP eligibles as a comparison group allowed us to understand what likely would have happened to the Medicaid expansion-eligible children without the legislative changes in the Medicaid program. Among the SCHIP-eligible children, rates of uninsurance increased over time. There were no significant improvements in access and use of services or in the financial burdens associated with paying for coverage and obtaining care. The trends possibly could have been worse among the lower income group of Medicaid eligibles. Nonetheless, and despite improvements in access, burden, and coverage among the children eligible for Medicaid under the expansions, there were large gaps between these children and those who were never eligible for public coverage in 1996.
There are some limitations to our analysis. Any simulation of eligibility for public programs will contain some error. Our Medicaid simulation is unable to account for eligibility through such avenues as spend-down, disability, and continuation of benefits. Furthermore, we have insufficient data to account for immigrant status. The ratio of children whom we deemed eligible and enrolled in Medicaid divided by all children enrolled in Medicaid was 77.9% in 1987 and 82.7% in 1996. In other words, we successfully simulated about four out of five enrolled children. To the extent that there are errors in the simulation of eligibility, these tend to dampen any differences we found between eligibility groups and thus blur the effects of the Medicaid expansions on access, burdens, and coverage.
There are several policy implications that arise from our analysis. In addition to improvements in coverage rates and access to care, the Medicaid expansions also reduced financial burdens for health care among the families of eligible children. This is a new and important result since financial barriers are the cause of delayed and foregone care in as many as 20.1% of families with expansion-eligible children. SCHIP should have similar effects in reducing financial burdens among eligible children's families. Finally, our results imply that increasing Medicaid enrollment among those eligible for coverage likely would result in further improvements in the ABCs of health care among the group of all eligible children.
Notes
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and no official endorsement by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality or the Department of Health and Human Services is intended or should be inferred.
1 We computed disposable income net of taxes for our calculations of out-of-pocket burdens. 2 Rather than take the differences of aggregate mean values, we computed the value of the D-in-D estimators by running linear regressions in STATA. This procedure calculated the correct standard errors, adjusting for the complex survey design of the MEPS and NMES data. It also allowed the addition of control variables to the model. 3 We also ran models that omitted income from the set of control variables. Results were essentially the same in terms of significance and size of coefficients. 4 A few states had expanded eligibility for Medicaid prior to 1987 primarily by using state funds. 5 Our eligibility simulation was unable to account for the immigrant status of children. There was no basis for making this determination in the 1987 NMES. For some children in the 1996 MEPS, there was a link to the 1995 NHIS where information on the country of birth and years living in the United States is available. It would be asymmetric to adjust for the later year of our analysis without being able to adjust for 1987. To the extent that our simulation overstated Medicaid eligibility because some children we deemed eligible were in fact ineligible because of immigrant status, then our results would tend to understate the impact of the Medicaid expansions. 6 We imputed for missing values in the 1987 premium variable for 2.7% of our sample of children. Most of these children were in middleand upper-income families. 7 We re-edited the original 1996 MEPS public use income variables using methods now regarded as standard for all MEPS income data. Making use of the link to NHIS income data from the previous year significantly improves the quality of the MEPS income data.
